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E l e c t r o n i c  S i g n a t u r e s  
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES 
ANOTHER STEP TOWARDS A EUROPEAN 
FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES THE 
COMMISSION'S DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL 
Rosa Julia-Barcel5 and Thomas C. Vinje I 
Parties involved in electronic commerce in open networks such as the Internet are faced with the problem of 
authentication of the communicating parties, i.e. knowing that the sender of an electronic message is actually 
the person he purports to be. In addition, communicating parties also need to ensure that the electronic mes- 
sage received is the one that actually was sent, i.e. the integrity of the message. 
These goals can be achieved through the use of electronic signatures, including digital signatures created 
through public key cryptography. However, for electronic signatures to accomplish such objectives in open net- 
works, they need to be used together with certificates issued by certification service providers that certify the 
link between the electronic signature and the identity of the electronic signature holder. Therefore, for electronic 
commerce to flourish, electronic signatures must be legally recognized as equivalent to their hand-written coun- 
terparts. In addition, a legal regime must be created for the establishment and operation of certification service 
providers that will generate trust among trading parties in certification authorities, and thereby in electronic sig- 
natures. 
In May 1998, the Commission presented a Proposal for a Directive aimed at establishing a legal framework for 
electronic signatures and certification service providers in Europe. The Proposal addresses, inter alia, the liabil- 
ity of certificate service providers towards third parties and the legal recognition of electronic signatures, both 
within Europe and internationally. The proposal provides that certification service providers need not obtain 
authorization to act as such, although Member States are free to introduce a system of voluntary accreditation 
for service providers. The Proposal has adopted a technologically neutral approach - -  governing electronic sig- 
natures generally rather than only digital signatures - -  in an effort to ensure that the Directive will not be made 
obsolete as technology progresses. 
Despite lacking clarity in certain important respects, the Proposal is to be welcomed and the Commission con- 
gratulated in taking a key step forward in promoting electronic commerce in Europe. 
On 13 May 1998, the Commission presented a proposal for a 
directive aimed at establishing a legal framework for electron- 
ic signatures and certification service providers in Europe 
( ' the Proposal'). 2 This article will provide a brief description 
and analysis of  the main issues addressed in the Proposal. 
ANTECEDENTS OFTHE PROPOSAL 
Most European Union Member States have laws requiring 
written documents  and hand-written signatures for purposes 
such as validity and enforceability of contracts and admissibil- 
ity and valuation of evidence. Electronic documents  and elec- 
tronic signatures are not always regarded as fulfilling these 
requirements. Until recently, however, the failure to give legal 
recognition to electronic documents  and signatures present- 
ed little obstacle to commerce.  Before the recent dramatic 
expansion of  the Internet, electronic documents  and signa- 
tures were  used only in the context  of closed networks. In 
particular, they were used be tween  individual businesses 
trading with one another through electronic data interchange 
(EDI), 3 and these trading parties would agree amongst them- 
selves on the legal value of electronic documents  and signa- 
tures as well as procedures  providing security to EDI 
transactions.Thus, little need was perceived for a legal regime 
governing electronic signatures. 
However, starting with the TEDIS project  4 in the early 
1990s, the European Commission perceived that EDI would 
expand from closed groups to open groups, and that a need 
would arise for legislation ensuring security of electronic 
transactions in this context. In particular, it was foreseen that 
there would be a need tot a legal regime recognizing elec- 
tronic signatures and governing the establishment and opera- 
tion of certification service providers (then called ' trusted 
third parties' or 'electronic notaries'), s 
In the end it was not the expansion of EDI to open 
groups, which has occurred only to a rather limited extent, 
but the expanded penetration of the In temet  that led to 
demands for the regulation of electronic signatures and certi- 
fication service providers. With the Internet 's ability to con- 
nect  - -  at low cost - -  vast numbers of  trading parties having 
no pre-existing relationship, enabling electronic transactions 
on a large scale, came a dramatically increased need for 
authenticity and integrity in such transactions. Contrary to 
business conducted in closed environments, where  the con- 
tracting parties know and trust one another, parties conduct- 
ing business in an open Internet environment  who  do not 
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know one another need special mechanisms to ensure that 
the person with whom one believes one is doing business is 
actually the person he purports to be (authenticity), and that 
the messages exchanged between contracting parties have 
not been altered (integrity). At least with respect to authen- 
ticity, such mechanisms are offered by certification service 
providers, who issue certificates guaranteeing the identity of 
the holder of a particular electronic signature and who main- 
tain databases ensuring the continued validity of such certifi- 
cates. 
Even if the ultimate driving force behind the need for 
greater security in electronic commerce  became the 
immense growth of the Internet rather than the expansion of 
EDI to open networks, the Commission's efforts in the EDI 
area proved valuable. In particular, beginning in 1992 the 
Commission funded numerous useful projects on both the 
technical and legal aspects of digital signatures .6 
For several years, however, the Commission took no leg- 
islative steps in this area, perhaps, among other reasons, 
because cryptography issues appeared to many to fall within 
the competency of the Member States. Meanwhile, in the 
United States and at international organization level, the legal 
debate became very heated and many legislative initiatives 
were launched. 
In the United States, since 1994 almost all the 50 states 
have either passed or initiated legislation on electronic or dig- 
ital signatures7 With respect to Federal legislation,Article 2B 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UUC), which will cover, 
inter alia, legal recognition of electronic records and signa- 
tures, is currently being drafted by the National Conference 
of Commissioners  on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL). s 
Moreover, the American Bar Association has published Digital 
Signature Guidelines. 9 
With regard to international organizations, in 1996 United 
Nations Commission on InternationalTrade Law (UNCITRAL) 
began working on a Proposal for Uniform Rules on Electronic 
Signatures, which will complement  the Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce.  m In 1997, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted 
Guidelines for Cryptography Policy to guide countries when  
drafting cryptography regulations. In the same year the 
International Chamber of Commerce published guidelines 
entitled "General Usage fi~r International  Digitally Ensured 
Commerce" with the objective of promoting the understand- 
ing of technical issues within the business community, li 
Finally, in April 1997, the European Commission issued a 
Communica t ion  enti t led "A European Ini t iat ive  on 
Electronic Commerce", 12 which, for the first time, officially 
recognized the need for building trust and confidence in elec- 
tronic transactions and announced,  inter alia, an initiative to 
establish an EU regulatory framework for digital signatures.A 
Bonn Ministerial Declaration also endorsed the need for a 
legal and technical framework at European level in digital sig- 
natures. 13 
In October 1997, a second Communicat ion entitled 
"Ensuring Security and  Trust in Electronic Communicat ion  
- -  Towards a European Framework for  Digital Signatures 
and  Encryption" was issued jointly by the Directorate 
Generals for Industry (DG XIII) and Internal Market (DG 
XV). 14 This Communication identified potential divergences 
among Member State laws as a basis for an EU initiative and 
enumerated the basic principles of the regulatory framework 
envisioned by the Commission for digital signatures and cer- 
tification service providers. Is Immediately after issuance of 
this Communication, the European Commission initiated an 
intense activity resulting in the recent Proposal. 
One of the reasons for this haste after several years of qui- 
escence is that be tween  the two Commission 
Communications various EU Member States had adopted 
laws or had proposed legislation on digital signatures) 6 Of 
those Member States already to have adopted laws, Germany 
was the first, inAugust 1997, to enact a Digital Signature law, 17 
followed by Italy in November 1997.18 
The Communication received a positive reaction from 
industry and Member States. Indeed, in December 1997 the 
Council of Ministers endorsed the Communication, inviting 
the Commission to submit a proposal in the second quarter 
of 1998.19 
LEGAL BASIS FOR THE PROPOSAL 
For some time, a key issue in the debate on electronic signa- 
tures was whether  the regulation of electronic signatures and 
certification service providers should be clone at the 
European or at national level. Now this question seems to 
have been  resolved by the above-ment ioned Com- 
munications and Council Resolution. 
As noted, from 1997 most Member States were consider- 
ing legislative actions in the field of electronic and digital sig- 
natures. Diverging approaches were emerging among the 
Member States. The Proposal's Explanatory Memorandum 
notes several possible discrepancies among legislative initia- 
tives of Member States, including the rules concerning the 
legal effect attributed to electronic signatures, liability rules 
applicable to certification service providers, and technical 
conditions under  which electronic signatures would be pre- 
sumed secure. 2° 
As the Proposal's Explanatory Memorandum correctly 
recognizes, the increasing number  of divergent legislative ini- 
tiatives in the Member States would lead to adoption of an 
unharmonized legal framework within the European Union. 
This would create barriers to the growth of electronic com- 
merce and, therefore, endanger the functioning of the 
Internal Market. For example, if a company in Belgium sold 
goods to another company in Spain over the Internet, using 
digital signature technology, and the Belgian courts refused to 
give legal recognition to the digital signature certified accord- 
ing to Spanish law in an action for payment brought by the 
Belgian seller against the Spanish buyer, this would hinder 
both the development of electronic commerce and trade 
between Member States. 
Therefore, the Proposal has as its objective the elimina- 
tion of these obstacles, "in particular differences concerning 
the legal recognition of electronic signatures and restriction 
on the free movement  of certification services and products 
between the Member States". In short, it seems that the 
Commission has properly identified a threat to the function- 
ing of the Internal Market in an area of vital importance to 
Europe's economic future, and that the Commission therefore 
has appropriately employed Articles 57(2), 66 and IOOA of 
the ECTreaty as the legal basis for the Proposal. Moreover, the 
Commission has respected the principle of subsidiarity by 
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carefully limiting its Proposal only to those issues that must 
be harmonized in order to avoid distortions of the Single 
Market. 
BASIC SCOPE AND APPROACH OFTHE 
PROPOSAL 
The two main objectives of the Proposal arc to establish the 
legal recognition of electronic signatures and the creation of 
a legal framework for the establishment and operation of cer- 
tification service providers. 
Legal recognition of electronic signatures 
Most European Union Member States have laws requiring 
wri t ten  documents  and hand-wri t ten signatures for purpos- 
es such as validity and enforceability of contracts and 
admissibility and valuation of evidence. 2j Electronic docu- 
ments  and electronic signatures will not  always be regard- 
ed as fulfilling these requirements,  and this lack of legal 
recognit ion presents  a barrier to the spread of electronic 
commerce.  
Article 1 of the Proposal addresses this issue, noting that 
the Proposal "aims at facilitating the use of electronic signa- 
tures as well as providing for their legal recognition". 
However, as Article 1 recognizes, the Proposal does not cover 
aspects related to the conclusion and validity of contracts or 
other, non-contractual, acts (such as the filing of tax returns). 
Therefore, Member States are not required to eliminate such 
formal requirements (including signatures) but to recognize 
that paper  requirements can be fulfilled by electronic 
means. 
This approach seems appropriate because, in order to 
eliminate obstacles to electronic commerce, it does not 
appear  necessary to eliminate or harmonize  formality 
requirements imposed by Member States as a basis for the 
validity of contracts or other acts. Moreover, it is important to 
keep in mind that such matters (e.g. the formalities required 
for the validity of contracts) generally do not fall within the 
Commission's competence.  Furthermore, formality require- 
ments find their roots in internal legal principles of Member 
States, and proposing the elimination or modification of such 
requirements would significantly increase the political diffi- 
culties likely to be faced by the Commission ha obtaining 
adoption of its Proposal. 
Indeed, proposals requiring changes to Member State for- 
mality requirements have been poorly received in the past. 
For example, in 1981, a Recommendation of the Council of 
Europe (N ° R (81) 20) recommended such changes, as did, in 
1985, the Recommendat ion  of the United Nations 
Commission on InternationalTrade Law. 22 Both recommenda- 
tions advised countries to eliminate legal requirements of 
paper documents  and hand-written signatures for evidentiary 
purposes as well as to decrease the value of the contracts 
requiring formalities. European Union Member States imple- 
mented none of these suggestions, on the grounds that the 
proposed modifications would distort traditional national 
contract and evidentiary rules, thus having a negative effect 
in other areas of law. By simply requiring Member States to 
provide that, under  certain circumstances, electronic signa- 
tures shall be deemed to satisfy existing requirements for 
hand-written signatures, the Proposal avoids this legal and 
political quagmire. 
Another wise choice made by the Commission was to 
adopt a technologically neutral approach to the legal recogni- 
tion of electronic signatures. The Proposal does not limit the 
recognition of signatures to those created using a specific 
type of technology. Indeed, it uses the general expression 
'electronic signatures' as opposed to special types of elec- 
tronic signatures such as digital signatures. 
This approach is reflected in Article 2, which contains, 
inter alia, a definition of 'signature' adopting a functional 
approach, establishing several requirements that must be ful- 
filled for any signature to qualify as a signature for the pur- 
poses of the Proposal. Specifically, the Proposal's defmition of 
an 'electronic signature' is a "signature in digital form in, or 
attached to, or logically associated with, data and used by a 
signatory to indicate the signatory's approval of the content  
of that data" .Additionally, to qualify as an electronic signature, 
any signature must: 
• be uniquely linked to the signatory 
• be capable of identifying the signatory 
° be created using means that the signatory can maintain 
under  his control 
• be linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner  
that it is revealed if the data is subsequently altered 
It can be seen that the criteria set forth byArticle 2 relate 
to the traditional functions of hand-written signatures: first, 
the ability to identify the signatory is reflected in the first two 
requirements. Second, the capacity of revealing alteration (or 
integrity) which is attributed (not always rightly) to written 
documents with a hand-written signature is reflected in the 
final requirement. However, the above criteria go further than 
the requirements met by a hand-written signature. Indeed, for 
example, a hand-written signature can be forged and thus will 
not necessarily stay within one's control. 
The technologically neutral approach allows room for 
future developments, thus encouraging the growth of new 
electronic signature techniques and provision of new busi- 
ness opportunities. Moreover, had the Proposal confined the 
legal recognition of signatures to the current digital signature 
technology, and one day this technology no longer provided 
adequate security (for example, because computer  capacity 
rose to the point  where it was possible rapidly to discover a 
private key from the public key), the law would become 
obsolete. 
Contrary to this approach, the Italian legislation on 
Electronic Documents and Digital Signatures and the German 
Digital Signature Act are limited to public-key cryptography, 
i.e. digital signatures. Moreover, the German law requires the 
satisfaction of very specific standards. This may mean that if 
the Proposal is adopted in its current form, the German and 
Italian legislation will need to be adapted to the Proposal. On 
the other hand, perhaps these laws could remain in place on 
the following theory: as long as Member States implement 
laws recognizing all electronic signatures that meet the gen- 
eral requirements set forth by the Directive, they may still 
enact specific rules for digital signatures establishing the cri- 
teria such signatures must fulfil to be deemed to meet the 
Directive's general criteria. 
Although the Commission's initiative to ensure the legal 
recognition of electronic signatures should be welcomed, 
Computer Law & Security Report Vol. 14 no. 5 1998 305 
0267 3649/98/$19.00 © 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved 
E l e c t r o n i c  S i g n a t u r e s  
one might question whether  the Commission should have 
extended its initiative to electronic documents  as well. As 
noted above, most Member States have laws requiring not 
only hand-written signatures but also 'written documents '  as 
conditions for the validity and enforceability of contracts and 
admissibility and valuation of evidence. Because there is 
uncertainty about whether  electronic documents will meet 
these requirements ,  it might have been  wise for the 
Commission to address this issue as well. This would ensure 
that electronic documents are given the same recognition as 
electronic signatures. 
Legal framework for certification service 
providers 
The trustworthiness of electronic signatures, and especially 
digital signatures, depends on the use of third parties, namely 
so-called certification service providers who provide the nec- 
essary assurances of the identity of the key holder by issuing 
certificates binding the public key of the key holder to his 
identity. 23 Because of the importance of certification service 
providers to secure electronic commerce and because of the 
lack of harmonized rules governing certification service 
providers, it is to be welcomed that the other main area 
addressed in the Commission's Proposal is the creation of a 
legal framework for the establishment and operation of certi- 
fication service providers. 
The legal framework for certification service providers 
established by the Proposal covers two aspects: first, the 
establishment of certification service providers, providing 
certain basic requirements for those who wish to act as certi- 
fication service providers; and, second, the operation of certi- 
fication service providers, i.e. the legal and technical  
requirements that must be fulfilled by the certification ser- 
vice provider w h e n  issuing certificates. However, the 
Proposal's legal framework for the establishment and opera- 
tion of certification service providers is limited, excluding 
certain areas from its application. 
First, Article 1 of the Proposal is limited to the establish- 
ment of a legal framework for certification services made 
available to the public. Moreover, the Proposal's Explanatory 
Memorandum explicitly indicates that no regulation is need- 
ed for closed environments  such as banking systems and cor- 
porate intranets. Instead, certification carried out in closed 
groups will be based on the principle of contractual freedom, 
thus enabling parties to agree on the terms and conditions 
under  which they do business. 
The significance of this carve-out becomes clear when  
one considers the size and importance of closed electronic 
environments that will fall outside the ambit of the Directive, 
such as those operated be tween certain large trading parties, 
between banks (for example, for credit card systems) and by 
professional organizations (e.g. chambers of lawyers and 
physicians). However, although the deference given by the 
Proposal to the principle of contractual freedom in the con- 
text of closed systems seems appropriate, one might wonder  
whether  those operating closed systems, while not reqnired 
to do so, might have incentives to comply with the rules 
established by the Directive. In particular, those groups (espe- 
cially within the banking sector) may have an interest in com- 
plying with the legal requirements laid down by the Proposal 
in order to benefit from the recognition accorded to elec- 
tronic signatures under  it. 
The availability of the legal recognition provided by the 
Proposal to electronic signatures based upon qualified certifi- 
cates (see below) would appear to be especially important 
insofar as courts may not allow contracting parties to decide 
for themselves on the admissibility and weight of evidence. 
Indeed, some courts might well say that this falls within their 
exclusive competence,  24 and deny the effectiveness of agree- 
ments between electronic trading parties providing that elec- 
tronic signatures shall have the same force of evidence as 
hand-written ones. 
Of course, this raises the question whether  parties 
employing electronic signatures in closed networks would be 
entitled to rely on the regime established by the Proposal. 
Unless they can do so, they might be left 'out in the cold' - -  
without the benefit either of contractual solutions or of the 
Proposal. Insofar as the Proposal is limited, in Article 1, to 
establishing a legal regime for certification services 'made 
available to the public',  2s it might be argued that trading par- 
ties operating in closed environments may not rely on the 
benefits of the regime to be established by the directive. 
However, this would be an unfortunate result; while it is 
appropriate to provide contractual freedom to those operat- 
ing in closed networks, it would seem wise to allow them to 
take advantage of the directive's regime if they see fit. 
Perhaps the Proposal should, as it makes its way through the 
legislative process, be clarified in this regard. Mternatively, the 
Directive might provide that courts must accept agreements 
between parties operating in closed environments about the 
admissibility and weight of electronic documents  and signa- 
tures. 
The second main way in which the Proposal's legal frame- 
work for the establishment and operation of certification ser- 
vice providers is limited is that it is intended to cover only 
one type of certificate, namely a digital attestation that links a 
signature verification device to a person, confirming the iden- 
tity of that person. Indeed, the Explanatory Memorandum 
explicitly recognizes that the Proposal focuses uniquely on 
the function of a certificate as a linkage to the civil identity or 
the role of a person:" [T]he legal framework is needed for cer- 
tificates to enable the authentication of the electronic signa- 
ture of a signing individual." 
However, as Article 2 of the Proposal points out,"certifica- 
tion services provide other services related to electronic sig- 
natures to the public". For instance, in addition to certifying 
the link between a particular signature and the identity of its 
holder, some certification service providers certify qualities 
of the signature holder (e.g. membership of a bar specialized 
in a particular legal area or compliance of a Web site operator 
with privacy laws). 26 The option taken by the Commission 
means that such certification services will fall outside the 
scope of the Directive. 2v This seems appropriate, and the 
Proposal's failure to address the legal effect of non-identity 
certificates would not seem to present any significant barrier 
to electronic commerce. 
We now proceed to a more detailed analysis of 
the Proposal. Because the rules on the legal effects of 
electronic signatures follow largely from the regime 
governing the establishment and operation of certification 
service providers, we turn first to a discussion of that regime. 
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ANALYSIS OFTHE PROPOSAL 
The Regime Governing the Establishment 
and Operation of Certification Service 
Providers 
The Licensing Debate 
One of the key questions when  drafting the Proposal was 
whether  certification authorities would have to be licensed 
to be permitted to act as such. Article 3 of the Proposal 
answers this question by providing that "Member States shall 
not  make the provision of certification services subject to 
prior authorization." However, Article 3.2 permits Member 
States to "introduce or maintain voluntary accreditation 
schemes aiming at enhanced levels of certification service 
provision'.2s 
From the formulation of Article 3, the tbllowing can be 
deduced: 
• First, certification services may be offered without prior 
authorization, i.e., anyone is free to offer certification ser- 
vices. 
• Second, EU Member States would keep the option of set- 
ting up voluntary accreditation schemes for service 
providers for enhanced levels of security. (Such schemes 
could require the fulfilment of certain conditions in order 
to achieve high levels of security.The basis for maintaining 
voluntary accreditation schemes may be found in the 
need for high level services among very specific groups 
such as notaries and physicians and the need even among 
the general public for high level services in certain cir- 
cumstances.) 
• Third, with respect to such voluntary accreditation 
schemes, Member States must ensure that all conditions 
related to such schemes are "objective, transparent, pro- 
portionate and non-discriminatory". (This is the standard 
commonly imposed by EU legislation to ensure the prop- 
er functioning of the Internal Market.) 
• Fourth, in operating voluntary accreditation schemes, 
Member States may not limit the number  of certification 
service providers. 
In opting for the 'voluntary' approach, the Commission 
appears to have followed the path employed in the German 
Digital Signature Law, although the German law's actual word- 
ing leaves some doubt about whether  it establishes a manda- 
tory licensing scheme. The Italian law is also somewhat 
unclear on this point: although an aspiring certification ser- 
vice provider must apply to the Autorita'per l 'informatica 
nella Pubblica Amministrazione (AIPA) before beginning 
operations and prove that it fulfils the requirements defined 
by the law, the AIPA appears to have no ability to prevent the 
applicant from beginning operations and no licence is issued 
by the AIPA. Finally, the UK Government,  in its "Secure 
Electronic Statement" issued in May 1998, abandoned the sug- 
gestion for a mandatory licensing system made earlier in its 
Public" Consultation Paper on Proposal for  Legislation on 
Trusted Third Parties 29 and now proposes a voluntary licens- 
ing scheme. 3° 
Although conditions established by Member State accred- 
itation schemes must be "objective, transparent, proportion- 
ate and non-discriminatory", the Proposal does not  specify 
the requirements that may be employed as the basis for 
accreditation. However, as discussed further below, the 
Proposal does contain an annex (Annex lI) that sets forth con- 
ditions that must be met by certification service providers in 
order for electronic signatures based on their certificates to 
be accorded certain legal benefits. 31 The availability of these 
legal benefits will give certification service providers an 
incentive to comply wi thAnnex II, and it seems likely that the 
criteria contained in Annex II will be employed by Member 
States in their voluntary accreditation schemes. 32 
Presumably in order to permit the Commission to moni- 
tor whether  Member State accreditation schemes meet the 
requirements established by Article 3 (and in particular the 
objectivity, transparency, proportionality and non-discrimina- 
tory conditions), Article 10 of the Proposal requires Member 
States regularly to provide information to the Commission 
about their accreditation schemes. 
The 'voluntary' approach is a good one: permitting corn- 
panics to provide certification services without authoriza- 
tion, and allowing accreditation schemes for those entities 
providing high standards of security, will permit desirable 
flexibility and limit the costs of certification services not 
requiring high levels of security. In addition, the absence of 
strict technical requirements and licensing obligations applic- 
able to all certification service providers will allow smaller 
actors with limited resources to provide certification ser- 
vices. 
Overall, this approach should encourage the development 
and competitiveness of the certification services market, ben- 
efiting both consumers  and certification providers. 
Consumers will also benefit from the fact that in operating 
voluntary accreditation schemes, Member States may not 
limit competit ion by restricting the number  of certification 
service providers. 
The Issuance of Certificates 
Qualified versus non-qualified certificates 
The Proposal differentiates between two types of certificates: 
qualified certificates and non-qualified certificates. Article 
2.5 defines the former as follows:"a digital attestation which 
links a signature verification device to a person, confirms the 
identity of that person and meets the requirements laid down 
inAnnex  I". In other words, a qualified certificate is an identi- 
ty certificate that fulfils the requirements of Annex 1. 
Annex I provides that a qualified certificate must contain, 
inter alia: 
• the identifier of the certification service provider issuing it 
• the 'unmistakable'  name of the holder of the certificate or 
an 'unmistakable' pseudonym that shall be identified as 
such 
• a specific attribute of the certificate holder such as his 
address, authority to act on behalf of a company, credit 
worthiness, VAT or other tax registration numbers  
• a signature verification device corresponding to a signa- 
ture creation device under  the control of the holder 
• the operational period of the certificate 
• any limitations on the scope of use of the certificate 
• any limitations on the service provider's liability or on the 
value of transactions for which the certificate is valid 
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Non-qualified certificates are not defined. Presumably, 
they include all certificates that do not fulfil the conditions to 
be a qualified certificate. In other words, non-qualified certifi- 
cates include (1) all non-identity certificates and (2) identity 
certificates not meeting the requirements of  Annex  L 
The capability to issue qualified certificates does not 
depend on whether  the certification service provider is 
accredited, or whether  it meets the requirements inAnnex II. 
On the contrary, it follows from the Proposal that any certifi- 
cation service provider can issue qualified certificates. 
However, as discussed further below, a qualified certifi- 
cate will enjoy certain legal benefits, including automatic evi- 
dentiary admissibility and t reatment  equivalent  to 
hand-written signatures, only if it is issued by a certification 
service provider meeting the requirements of Annex II. 
Because these legal benefits are of considerable importance 
(indeed they are central to the legal recognition accorded to 
electronic signatures by the Proposal), users will have a pow- 
erful incentive, in many cases, to obtain qualified certificates 
from service providers meeting the requirements of Annex II 
- -  and certification service providers therefore will have a 
strong incentive to comply with Annex II. 
Of course, certification service providers, even those 
meeting the requirements of Annex II, will surely continue to 
offer a range of certification products; they will issue not  only 
qualified certificates, hut also often non-qualified certificates. 
Among these non-qualified certificates will be not only non- 
identity certificates (which by their nature will be non-quali- 
fied certificates), but also identity certificates that provide 
less security (e.g. so-called level 0 certificates) and that do not 
constitute qualified certificates because they do not meet the 
requirements of Annex I. For example, to obtain such low- 
security certificates one need not provide any document  
demonstrating one's identity. Such certificates are satisfactory 
for use in connect ion with relatively unimportant  transac- 
tions, for example, where it is not cost-effective to invest in a 
high degree of security. 
The question of legal persons 
One issue that has generated surprising controversy in some 
countries has been whether  certificates granted to legal per- 
sons should enjoy the same legal benefits as certificates 
issued to natural persons. Insofar as Article 2.5 of the Proposal 
defines 'qualified certificates' as those verifying the identity of 
'a person' ,  without making any distinction between physical 
and legal persons, one might conclude that not only certifi- 
cates issued to physical persons but to legal persons will be 
eligible for the legal recognition guaranteed by the Proposal. 
Although Annex I(c) includes among attributes that may be 
contained in a certificate "the authority to act on behalf of a 
company", theAnnex does not  require such an attribute to be 
contained in any certificate.Therefore, it would seem wrong 
to infer that Annex I(c) somehow excludes certificates issued 
to legal persons from the Proposal's coverage. 
In our view, certificates should be allowed to link signa- 
tures not only to the identity of physical persons but also to 
that of legal persons, and certificates issued to legal persons 
should be entitled to the same legal benefits as those issued 
to physical persons. It should be left to companies to decide 
whether  to use one or the other: we can see no way in which 
the availability of corporate identity certificates could disad- 
vantage any third party, and companies therefore should be 
left to themselves to decide whether  they wish to accept the 
risk of being bound by non-identified persons. 
If, for example, a corporation chooses to obtain a certifi- 
cate in the name of the corporation, and it then permits cor- 
porate personnel  to employ this certificate and to issue 
digital signatures directly on behalf of the corporation, the 
law should fully recognize the validity of such signatures.The 
corporation should be allowed to decide for itself whether  it 
wishes to run the risk that it will become liable for use of the 
corporation's certified signature by employees for unautho- 
rized purposes - -  and that the corporation will not be able to 
identify the physical person (whether  an unauthorized 
employee or a thief) because the certificate identifies only 
the corporation. Perhaps the corporation's choice would be 
based on the technology used; for example, in the context of 
EDI, where contracting occurs between computers rather 
than actual persons, it would seem rather anomalous for sig- 
natures to identify, physical rather than legal persons. 
Moreover, it should be taken into account that if qualified 
certificates may not identify legal persons, companies that 
wish to use this type of certificate will need to use non-quali- 
fied certificates, with resulting disadvantages for public 
confidence. 
Division of service provider roles 
Service providers must fill various roles. For example, service 
provider functions include the technical functions of generat- 
ing key-sets, maintaining a certificate revocation database, and 
issuing certificates. In addition, service providers must fulfil a 
registration function - -  before issuing certificates, certifica- 
tion service providers must obtain and verify certain informa- 
tion. For instance, the certification service provider may need 
to ascertain and verify the name of the holder and attributes 
such as address, authority to act on behalf of a company, and 
tax registration numbers.  
So far, companies offering certification services have tend- 
ed to be companies with technical expertise, and it may be 
more efficient and effective for them to contract out to others 
non-technical tasks such as registration. In our view, it should 
be permissible for different actors to share the different roles 
service providers must fulfil.Allowing such a division of roles 
may be the only way to enable small certification service 
providers, who for example may not have sufficient resources 
to maintain a 24-hour database of revoked certificates, to be 
in the market and compete with larger companies. 
The Proposal does not address the legality of such divi- 
sion of roles. In principle, nothing would seem to prevent 
such arrangements, although questions might arise about 
who bears liability among the different actors. Presumably, 
the actual issuer of the certificate will be liable under  the 
rules established by the Proposal, although a party to whom 
the registration function has been assigned might ultimately 
be held liable for failure properly to carry out the registration 
function. 
Liability of certification service providers 
One of the main areas of discussion with respect to the 
legal regime governing certification service providers is the 
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scope of service provider  liability.To take just one example, 
should service providers be strictly liable for issuing certifi- 
cates containing inaccurate information about  the identity 
of the certificate holder, or should some other  liability stan- 
dard apply? 
The Proposal addresses this issue in Article 6, but it estab- 
lishes a set of rules on liability that apply only when  the ser- 
vice provider (whether accredited or not) issues quali f ied 
certificates.Thus, when  a certification service provider issues 
non-qualifi'ed certificates, it presumably will be subject to 
general liability rules under  national law. Thus, the issuance, 
for example, of non-identity certificates would not be subject 
to the Proposal's liability regime. 
For qualified certificates, the Proposal establishes the fol- 
lowing liability regime: first, it seems that the regime governs 
liability only between certification service providers and 
third parties. This conclusion appears to follow from the 
introductory sentence to Article 6 of the Proposal, which 
addresses only a service provider's liability to "any person 
who reasonably relies on the certificate". Moreover, the items 
identified in Article 6 with respect to which certification ser- 
vice providers may incur liability appear to apply only to 
third parties who rely upon certificates, and not to certificate 
holders. Therefore, it seems that the Proposal does not 
address the scope of service provider liability to certificate 
holders. Moreover, it would seem to follow that service 
providers may contractually exclude any liability to certificate 
holders, except to the extent this ability is limited by other 
laws such as consumer protection laws. 
Second, vis-a-vis third parties who 'reasonably rely' on a 
qualified certificate, service providers are liable for the fol- 
lowing: 
a) the accuracy of all information in the certificate as of the 
date it was issued, unless the certification service provider 
has stated otherwise in the certificate 33 
b) compliance with all requirements of the Directive in issu- 
ing the certificate 
c) assurance that the holder identified in the qualified cer- 
tificate held, at the time of the issuance of the certificate, 
the signature creation device corresponding to the signa- 
ture verification device given or identified in the certifi- 
cate 
d) assurance that the signature creation device and the sig- 
nature verification device function together in a comple- 
mentary manner, in the cases where the certification 
service provider generates the devices 34 
Third, although Article 6 requires Member States to ensure 
that a service provider 'is liable' to reasonably relying third 
parties for the items listed above, it is not very clear what 
standard should apply to imposing such liability. In particular, 
is this article intended to impose a strict liability standard? 
Only by reading Article 6.1 in conjunct ion with Article 6.2 
might one conclude that a strict liability standard seems to be 
intended. 
Specifically, in Article 6.2, the Proposal provides that a ser- 
vice provider shall not  be liable "for errors in the information 
in the qualified certificate that has been provided by the per- 
son to whom the certificate is issued, ~f it  can demonstrate  
that  it  has taken all reasonably practieable measures  to ver- 
ify that  inf i )rmation [emphasis added]". Insofar as the ser- 
vice provider could avoid liability only by making this 
demonstration, it would appear that the general  liability stan- 
dard is not one of a duty of care, but rather one of strict liabil- 
ity. Moreover, insofar asArticle 6 provides for the possibility to 
avoid liability essentially by demonstrating compliance with a 
duty of reasonable care only with respect to errors resulting 
from information provided by certificate holders - -  and not 
with respect to the other items for which liability might be 
imposed under  Articles 6.1 (b), (c), and (d) - -  it would seem 
that the liability regime applicable to these latter items is one 
of strict liability. 
Thus, in effect the Proposal seems to establish a two- 
tiered set of liability criteria. Even if the Proposal seeks to 
establish a strict liability standard for the items listed in 
Article 6.1 (b), (c), and (d), this standard is tempered with 
respect to Article 6.1 (a). For the accuracy of information con- 
tained in a qualified certificate (at least to the extent that 
information has been provided by the certificate holder), the 
Proposal establishes essentially a with-fault liability regime. 
Assuming the above interpretation of Article 6 is correct, 
and in general a strict liability regime is intended, it would 
have been preferable for the Proposal to have expressed this 
point more clearly. 
Apart from establishing the above-described general liabil- 
ity scheme,Article 6 sets forth two ways in which a certifica- 
tion service provider may limit its liability to third parties. 
First, it may indicate in the certificate certain limits on its use. 
If the certificate is used 'contrary' to these limits, the service 
provider shall not be liable. Second, the service provider may 
indicate in the certificate a limit on the value of transactions 
for which the certificate is valid, and it will not  be liable Ibr 
damages to third parties beyond that limit. 
With respect to such limitations, the Proposal answers 
one of the questions with respect to which controversy has 
existed, namely whether  such limitations (1) must be con- 
tained in the certificate or (2) may be contained in separate 
document  and addressed only by reference in the certificate 
itself. In a move that is favourable to consumer protection, the 
Proposal requires limitations to be contained in the certifi- 
cate itself. 
In addition, Article 6.5 recognizes the continued applica- 
bility of the Directive 93/13/EC on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts.This would seem to mean, for instance, that certain 
limits will exist upon certification service providers' ability to 
include liability exclusions in their contracts with certificate 
holders - -  at least where the certificate holders are con- 
sumers. 
Finally, one highly important  issue related to the liability 
of certification service providers that is not addressed by 
the Proposal is the question of liability for failure to main- 
tain an accuratc database of revoked certificates.As noted 
above, in order to establish a trustworthy framework for dig- 
ital signatures, it is necessary to establish a trustworthy data- 
base maintaining an up-to-date list of valid certificates (so 
that trading parties can have the requisite confidence that 
the certificate holder's private key has not been  compro- 
mised during the time be tween  the certificate was issued 
and the moment  it is actually used). 3s Because severe dam- 
age can be caused to third parties who rely on an inaccurate 
database for the conclusion that a certificate remains valid 
when  in fact it is not, it is surprising that the Proposal fails 
to address this issue. 
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Legal Effects of Electronic Signatures 
Electronic signatures cannot play their proper role in facilitat- 
ing electronic commerce unless they are legally recognized. 
Article 5 of the Proposal aims to provide legal recognition to 
electronic signatures in the same way as their paper counter- 
parts. 
Article 5 is divided into two parts. First,Article 5.1 relates 
to electronic signatures generally, andArticle 5.2 accords spe- 
cial benefits only to qualified certificates issued by service 
providers complying with Annex IL 
With respect to electronic signatures generally, Article 5.1 
provides that electronic signatures shall not be denied legal 
effect, validity and enforceability solely on the following three 
grounds: 
• the fact that the signature is in electronic form 
• the fact that the signature is not based on a qualified cer- 
tificate 
• the fact that the signature is not based upon a certificate 
issued by an accredited service provider 
The formulation of Article 5.1 is significant not only for 
what it does say, but also for what it does not.Article 5.1 does 
provide that an electronic signature shall not be denied legal 
effect, validity or enforceability on the above grounds. But 
Article 5.1 does not say that any electronic signature auto- 
matically will be accorded such benefits. Presumably, then, it 
would remain up to the person who seeks to rely upon  a par- 
ticular signature not qualifying for special benefits under  
Article 5.2 to demonstrate that it meets some general require- 
ments of reliability in order to qualify for legal recognition. In 
addition, Member States presumably remain free to establish 
certain criteria that will be employed by the courts to deter- 
mine whether  electronic signatures not qualifying for special 
treatment under  Article 5.2 will be accorded legal recogni- 
tion. 
Unlike Article 5.1, which merely provides that electronic 
signatures shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforce- 
ability on certain grounds, Article 5.2 affirmatively requires 
Member States to accord certain legal recognition to elec- 
tronic signatures if they: (1) are based on a qualified certifi- 
cate and (2) the certificate has been issued by a service 
provider meeting the requirements of Annex II. 
Compliance with Annex II is of course intended to ensure 
the reliability of the certification service provider.To comply 
with Annex II, service providers must, inter alia, operate a 
prompt and secure revocation service; employ personnel  
possessing certain expert knowledge, experience, and qualifi- 
cations; use certain trustworthy systems and products; and 
maintain sufficient financial resources. 
Electronic signatures meeting the requirements of Article 
5.2 must be accorded two legal benefits: 
• assurance that they satisfy the legal requirement of a 
hand-written signature 
• admissibility as evidence in legal proceedings in the same 
manner  as hand-written signatures 
The formulation of Article 5 gives rise to several ques- 
tions. First, why is there a difference between the legal bene- 
fits that may not be denied on the grounds specified in Article 
5.1 and the legal benefits that must be accorded to certain 
signatures under  Article 5.2? 
Article 5.1 provides that an electronic signature may not 
be denied "legal effect, validity and enforceability', whereas 
Article 5.2 requires certain electronic signatures to be 
deemed (1)" to satisfy the legal requirement of a hand-written 
signature and (2) to he admissible as evidence to the same 
extent as a hand-written signature. Apart from the fact that it 
is rather unusual to speak of the 'enforceability' of a signature 
(whether hand-written or electronic), do the two legal bene- 
fits that must be accorded under  Article 5.2 fall within the 
terms 'legal effect and validity'? For example, would denial of 
the admissibility of an electronic signature as evidence con- 
stitute a denial of the signature's legal effect, validity or 
enfi)rceability? The answer to this question does not seem 
clear. If the answer is "no", then apparently courts may deny 
that electronic signatures satisfy the legal requirement of a 
hand-written signature and deny their admissibility as evi- 
dence based solely on the fact that they are in electronic form 
or that they are not based on a qualified certificate issued by 
an accredited service provider. In any event, it would be help- 
ful for this issue to be clarified. 
Second, how will a person seeking to rely upon  an elec- 
tronic signature demonstrate in a given case that the issuing 
certification service provider fulfils the requirements of 
Annex II? If such a person must submit substantial evidence 
about the certification service provider to make this demon- 
stration, the benefits of Article 5.2 are likely in practice to be 
rather ephemeral. 
In light of the difficulties individual certificate holders 
would appear to face in demonstrating on their own in indi- 
vidual lawsuits that the service provider that issued a particu- 
lar certificate met the requirements of Annex II, perhaps the 
most likely result is the following: Member States will develop 
voluntary accreditation schemes linked to the requirements 
of Annex II, and courts will rely on accreditations issued 
under  such schemes to conclude that the requirements of 
Annex II are met for purposes of Article 5.2 of the Proposal. 
Insofar as users would thus have a great incentive to 
obtain qualified certificates only from accredited service 
providers, one could legitimately ask how 'voluntary' such an 
accreditation scheme would be in practice. In the end, it 
seems likely that nearly all service providers issuing qualified 
certificates will effectively be forced to become accredited, 
and that accreditation schemes will be linked to Annex II. 
Third, what is the regime applicable to the legal recogni- 
tion of electronic signatures in public documents? When the 
law requires a hand-written signature before a notary, would 
an electronic signature fulfilling all the requirements estab- 
lished by the Proposal be valid? Insofar as Article 5.2 of the 
Proposal says generally that"electronic signatures ... based on 
a qualified certificate issued by a certification service 
p rov ider . . ,  fulfilling the requirements set out in Annex I I . . .  
satisfy the legal requirement of a hand-written signatures", a 
literal interpretation would seem to include all types of signa- 
tures, both ones contained in private documents  and those 
done before a notary. 
International Recognition 
Given the global nature of electronic commerce, the cross- 
border recognition of electronic certificates and signatures is 
a key issue. Article 4 of the Proposal addresses this question 
among the EU Member States, and Article 7 deals with the 
issue of EU recogni t ion of electronic certificates and 
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signatures issued by certification service providers estab- 
lished in third countries. 
Article 4 of the Proposal guarantees the free circulation 
and non-discriminatory treatment of electronic signature ser- 
vices and products within the European Union. In particular, 
"Member States may not  restrict the provision of certification 
services that originate in another Member State in the fields 
covered by [the] Directive" and they are obligated to ensure 
that "electronic signature products which comply with [the] 
Directive are permitted to circulate freely in the Internal 
Market" . Thus, for example, a German court must accord the 
benefits guaranteed by Article 5.2 to an electronic signature 
based on a qualified certificate issued by a service provider in 
Spain that fulfils the requirements of Annex II. (Presumably 
the German court would also have to accord equal weight to 
a voluntary accreditation issued in Spain confirming compli- 
ance with Annex II.) 
Concerning certificates issued in third countries,Article 7 
of the Proposal requires Member States to treat such certifi- 
cates as legally equivalent to those issued by an EU-based ser- 
vice provider under  the following three circumstances: 
• if the certification service provider fulfils the require- 
ments laid down in the Directive and has been accredited 
in the context of a voluntary accreditation scheme estab- 
lished by a Member State of the European Community 
• if a certification service provider established within the 
European Community that fulfils the requirements laid 
down in Annex II guarantees the certificate, to the same 
extent as for its own certificates 
• if the certificate or the certification service provider is 
recognized under  the regime of a bilateral or multilateral 
agreement between the European Community and third 
countries or international organizations 
As one respected commentator  has noted, the second 
method of recognizing non-EU certificates provided for in 
Article 7 is especially interesting, "as it provides another 
method of international recognition in addition to the more 
conventional methods of accreditation in the forum or by 
international treaty . . . .  In practice, this option will most like- 
ly be used not so much by foreign certification authorities 
contracting with an EU [service provider], but by the sub- 
sidiaries of multinational companies already active in the EU 
themselves becoming accredited and then guaranteeing the 
certificates of their non-EU associated entities."56 
CONCLUSION 
Despite a lack of clarity in several significant respects, the 
Proposal is to be welcomed. The existing uncertainty in the 
European Union regarding the legal recognition of electronic 
signatures and the rules governing the establishment and 
operation of certification service providers is a significant 
obstacle to the development of electronic commerce, and the 
Proposal goes a long way towards eliminating this uncertain- 
ty and creating a level playing field throughout the European 
Union and beyond. 
The Commission should be congratulated, among other 
things, for adopting a consumer-friendly yet flexible, techno- 
logically neutral approach, emphasizing a voluntary regime 
for certification service provider accreditation, and acknowl- 
edging the need for smooth cross-border recognition of elec- 
tronic signatures not only within the European Union but 
with third countries as well. 
As the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament 
now address the Proposal, they should consider adopting 
amendments  to address the issues raised above, in particular 
with respect to the formulation of the liability regime and the 
rules governing the legal recognition of electronic signatures. 
With some clarifications on these and a few other points, the 
ultimate Directive could become one of the key paving 
stones on the way towards a thriving electronic commerce in 
Europe. 
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ited service providers in the public sector (e.g. in connec- 
tion with the filing of tax returns)? Or does it mean that in 
the public sector Member States may require the use of 
electronic signatures that have been certified by service 
providers meeting a standard higher than that established 
by Annex II? The latter interpretat ion might meet  the con- 
cerns of the German government,  which has been  planning 
large-scale programmes requiring compliance with the 
strict standards adopted in the German Digital Signature 
Law. See C. Kuner,"The Emerging European Framework for 
Digital Signatures", BNA Electronic Commerce  a n d  Law 
Report, 27 May 1998. In any event, it would seem appropri- 
ate for Article 3.4 of the proposal to be reformulated so its 
meaning is clear. 
29Department of Trade and Industry, Public Consultation 
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Paper on Detailed Proposals for Legislation "Licensing of 
Trusted Third Parties for the Provision of Eneryption 
Services, March 1997. 
3°Department of Trade and Industry, Secure Electronic 
Commerce  Statement ,  27 April 1998. Available at 
http ://www.dti.gov.uk/CII/ana27p.html. 
31For example, Annex II requires certification service 
providers to operate a prompt and secure certificate revoca- 
tion service, to employ personnel  with particular expertise, 
I and to maintain sufficient Financial resources. 
3 2  • Article 9 of the Proposal provides for a consultative coin- 
mittee composed of Member State representatives that will 
I advise the Commission on, inter alia, the requirements laid 
down in Annex lI. It can be hoped that the operation of this 
committee will, at least informally, lead to a high level of con- 
sistency in the application of Annex II and the criteria 
employed by Member States in their voluntary accreditation 
schemes. 
33This formulation of Article 6.1 (a) is unsatisfactory. 
Specifically, it is not  at all clear precisely what the service 
provider might 'state otherwise' in the certificate, and thus 
for what  the service provider might escape liability by so 
stating. Does this phrase inArticle 6.1 (a) mean that a service 
provider may exculpate itself from liability vis&-vis third par- 
ties for inaccuracies in the information contained in the cer- 
tificate if it states in the certificate that it shall not have such 
liability? If this is not what this provision means, it is unclear 
what else it might mean. 
34Proposal,Article 6.1. 
~SIn this context, it should be noted that point (b) of Annex II 
explicitly requires a "prompt and secure revocation service". 
36Kuner, supra note 28, p. 715. 
Book Review 
Multimedia 
Adapting the EU Regulatory Framework to the Developing Multimedia Environment - -  A Study for the European 
Commi~ion  (DGX]]I), three volumes plus summary report, 1998, soft-cover, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey 
This study, which does not  have an ISBN reference, was prepared for the DGXIII of the European Commission by 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey LLP and Analysis Ltd in fulfilment of a Commission contract.The work is divided into four vol- 
umes - -  a summary report, a main report, and two annexes.These documents  present an analysis of the legal and regula- 
tory issues surrounding the development of a multimedia market in the European Union. The context is the Internet,  
which has enhanced the visibility of the multimedia market within the European Union and the United States. Estimates of 
the number  of Intcrnet  users worldwide vary from 35-60 million, and the Internet market, including networks and ser- 
vices, may be worth 10 billion ECU by the year 2000. Digital broadcasting has also been launched, with many players now 
exploring the delivery of multimedia services over digital broadcast networks. Chapter 1 of the study provides an 
overview of the current market sectors that will comprise the future multimedia market. Chapter 2 builds on the infor- 
mation presented in the earlier sections, providing additional supporting evidence. In particular, it examines the key medi- 
um term developments in market structure, pricing and standardization. This discussion also addresses regulatory 
problems that could arise as players seek to build market share in the new markets.The third section reviews the evolu- 
tion of multimedia markets in terms of a series of key regulatory themes, ranging from pricing practices to public service 
goals. It also reviews an alternative regulatory model, which reflects the market realities of convergence in the light of the 
distinctive regulatory traditions of the Member States. Section four seeks to synthesise the previous discussion into a set of 
options and recommendations for adapting the telecoms regulatory framework within the European Union to a future 
multimedia market. The fifth section, which is Annex 1 of the study, offers a comparative overview of the current legal 
framework governing key regulatory issues affecting multimedia in each of the Member States (current to 1 October 
1997). It examines how barriers are breaking down between the hitherto separate sectors of telecoms and broadcasting 
and identifies variations in achievement of multimedia companies across the European Union in terms of market entry and 
operation.The final part, which isAnnex 2 of the stud~, oflkrs a detailed review of the Member States' laws relevant to con- 
vergence issues and regulatory governance in a multimedia environment.  
Further information from: Squires, Sanders and Dempsey LLP, Brussels Office, Avenue Louise 165, B-1050, Brussels, 
Belgnim; tel: +32 2 627 11 11 or fax: +32 2 627 11 00; Internet: www.ssd.com. 
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